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Size of Expenditure Multipliers for Indian States: Does the Level of Income and Public 
Debt Matter? 




In this paper we apply panel vector error correction model to analyze the role of debt burden and 
income level in determining expenditure multipliers of Indian states. Our main results based on 
annual data from 1990-91 to 2015-16 suggest that the size of multiplier is sensitive to expenditure 
composition, debt level and the per capita income. The development expenditure multiplier is 
found to be 1.74 times of total expenditure multiplier. Further, the multipliers are found to be 
larger for low debt states than the high debt states, for both total expenditure and development 
expenditure. The impact of income on multiplier is, however, asymmetric across expenditures. 
While total expenditure multiplier is higher for low income states, development expenditure 
multiplier is found to be highest in high income states. 
JEL Codes: C23, E62, H32, H70 
Keywords: Fiscal policy, panel data, expenditure multipliers, dynamic fixed effect estimator 
I. Introduction 
Fiscal stimulus were implemented by a number of developed and emerging market 
economies to revive slowdown in demand caused by the global financial crisis (IMF 2010). 
Consequently, the analysis of expenditure multipliers gained traction and more precise 
estimates of multipliers such as for short-run and long-run, for different expenditure 
components, and under specific economic/policy environment are being attempted by the 
researchers. These estimates are helpful for policymakers to gauge the likely impact of fiscal 
adjustment/stimulus. Therefore, in the recent period, the focus of analysis is being extended to 
examine the impact of country/economy specific factors on the size of multipliers.  
The expenditure multiplier measures change in output due to change in government 
spending. The size of multiplier can be measured in terms of the impact multiplier, multiplier 
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at some horizon and cumulative multiplier, as defined below (Batini et al., 2014; Spilimbergo 
et al., 2009). 
Impact multiplier = ∆𝑌 (𝑡)/(∆𝐺(𝑡)) 
Multiplier at some horizon i = ∆𝑌 (𝑡 + 𝑖)/(∆𝐺(𝑡)) 
Cumulative multiplier = ∑  ∆𝑛𝑗=0 𝑌 (𝑡 + 𝑗)/ ∑  ∆𝑛𝑗=0 𝐺(𝑡 + 𝑗)) 
where, ∆ is change, Y is output, G is government expenditure and t is time period (usually a 
quarter or year). 
Empirical studies finds that the size of expenditure multiplier can be influenced by the 
level of government debt and economic development apart from other factors such as economic 
cycle, effectiveness of monetary policy, trade openness and exchange rate regime (Ilzetzki et 
al., 2012; Koh 2016; Combes et al., 2016; and Deskar-Skrbic et al., 2017). Multiplier are also 
found to be sensitive to expenditure composition in cross-country (Ilzetzki et al., 2012; Boitani 
and Perdichizzi, 2018) and Indian context (Guimarães 2010; Jain and Kumar 2013; Bose and 
Bhanumurthy 20153; Goyal and Sharma 2018; and Mishra, 2019). Therefore, the assessment 
of expenditure multipliers for different types of expenditures for a given debt level and income 
level can help policymakers to design an appropriate fiscal stimulus.  
While multipliers are usually examined for public expenditure of general /central 
government, multipliers of states (sub-national governments) assumes importance in India’s 
federal structure in view of their powers to raise revenues and expenditure responsibilities. 
State governments have been given major expenditure responsibilities viz., agriculture, rural 
development, education, health, law and order etc. which are crucial for improving social and 
economic infrastructure. States also levy important taxes such as value added tax (VAT)4, state 
excise duty, and stamps and registrations. The significance of state level fiscal policy can be 
observed from states share in India’s general government expenditure (Centre + States) which 
has been greater than 50 per cent since 1990-91 and it has reached to more than 60 percent in 
2015-16. Hence, public expenditure at the state level influences state economies as well as the 
national economy. This is corroborated by fiscal stimulus undertaken by Indian states in the 
aftermath of global financial crisis. To contribute to the expansionary fiscal policy, deficit 
                                                          
3 Bose and Bhanumurthy 2015 argued that capital expenditure multiplier would be higher due to crowds-in of 
private investment led by public investment and an accelerator effect. 
4 With the implementation of goods and services tax (GST) from July 1, 2017, state value added tax is subsumed 
in GST along with other indirect taxes. 
3 
 
targets of states stipulated under Fiscal Responsibility Legislations were relaxed (2004-08) 
(IMF 2010 and RBI 2010).  
Although the state governments are playing greater and steadily increasing role in terms 
of provision of public goods and services, large variations in per capita expenditure exists 
across states. During 1990-2016, the average per capita public expenditure of five low income 
states viz., Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh was just 51 per cent of 
the average expenditure of relatively high income states viz., Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, Punjab and Tamil Nadu, reflecting income as the important determinant of public 
expenditure. Further, the composition of expenditure is influenced by fiscal position of a state 
wherein discretionary expenditure (having higher multiplier effects) is curtailed during high 
debt/deficit phases (Raut and Raju, 2019). For example, during 1990-2016, the average share 
of development expenditure in total expenditure for high debt states was lower at 63 per cent 
as compared to 68 per cent for relatively low debt states5. Therefore, the impact of debt position 
could influence multipliers through expenditure composition channel6 apart from Ricardian 
equivalence and interest rate channel argued by earlier studies (Ilzetzkiet al., 2012; Combes et 
al., 2016; Deskar et al., 2017; and Huidrom et al., 2019).  
Against this backdrop of the impact of country characteristics on expenditure 
multiplier, variations in debt burden and per capita income across Indian states are likely to 
influence multiplier effects of their expenditures. This particular aspect has not been explored 
in earlier studies in the Indian context. Accordingly, this paper attempts to fill the gap by 
examining total and development expenditure multipliers for ‘high debt states’ and ‘low debt 
states’, and ‘high income states’ and ‘low income states’. The paper has been organized into 
four sections. Section II presents the review of literature on fiscal multipliers focusing on 
studies examining importance of expenditure composition, and the role of debt and income. 
Section III discusses the data, methodology and the empirical results. The concluding 
observations are provided in section IV.  
II. Review of Literature 
Economic theory provides divergent views about the role of fiscal policy in stabilizing 
output. Keynesian view of active role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stabilization suggests 
positive fiscal multipliers. Keynes advocated that increased public spending through deficit 
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6
 To illustrate, low debt states will have lower committed expenditure such as interest payments which will create 
fiscal space for these states and will allow them to spend more on discretionary development expenditure/ capital 
outlay having higher multipliers (Jain and Kumar 2013; Bose and Bhanumurthy 2015). 
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financing can stimulate aggregate demand and revive the economy during economic 
slowdown. On the other hand, Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis postulates that debt financed 
fiscal expansions will not change income as consumers would save more anticipating sooner 
increase in taxes. However, most of the empirical studies have found positive multipliers 
supporting the Keynesian view.  
Multiplier effects were found to vary across components of public expenditure. Some 
cross-country studies have found investment expenditure multiplier higher than the 
consumption expenditure due to demand effects in the short-run and supply/crowding in effects 
in the long-run (Ilzetzki et al., 2012; Boitani and Perdichizzi, 2018). On the other hand, Garry 
and Valdivia (2017) found current expenditure multiplier higher than the capital expenditure 
for Latin America and the Caribbean countries, which was attributed to miniscule share of 
capital expenditure in total expenditure. 
In the Indian context, most of the studies have found higher multiplier for 
capital/development expenditure compared to total expenditure and revenue expenditure. 
Guimarães (2010) using structural and recursive vector autoregression (VAR) models based 
on quarterly data from 1996:Q2 to 2009:Q3 observed impact multiplier for current expenditure 
at 1 which declined to 0.5 after 4-5 quarters due to crowding out. The multiplier for 
development expenditure was greater than 1 and persisted for 16 quarters. An analysis of 
multiplier effects was also undertaken for states using a panel generalized method of moments 
(GMM) and the multiplier for real primary spending was high and ranged between 0.9 - 1.3. 
Jain and Kumar (2013) estimated multipliers for central government, state governments and 
general government applying structural VAR model on annual data from 1980-81 to 2011-12 
for different categories of expenditure. The impact multiplier for non-defence capital outlay 
was highest (1.81) and for revenue expenditure it was the lowest (0.37) implying crowding out 
of private demand. As regards, the central government, the impact multiplier was lowest for 
development expenditure (0.19) and highest for non-defence capital outlay (2.10). In case of 
states, the impact multiplier was lowest for revenue expenditure and highest for development 
expenditure. The study also found highest cumulative multiplier of capital outlay among all the 
expenditure categories for both general government, central government and state government. 
Among layers of government, they found higher multipliers for different categories of states 
expenditure which was attributed to small scale nature and lower gestation period of projects 
at states level as compared to the higher level of government. Bose and Bhanumurthy (2015) 
estimated multipliers for general government in India using the data from 1991 to 2012. The 
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size of the impact multiplier for transfer payments was 0.98 while that for other revenue 
expenditure was 0.99. The impact multiplier for capital expenditure was much higher at 2.45. 
They argued that public investment crowds-in private investment and there is an accelerator 
effect of investment on output. Goyal and Sharma (2018) estimated multipliers for the central 
government’s total, revenue and capital expenditure using a SVAR model on quarterly data. 
They found impact multiplier highest for revenue expenditure and cumulative multiplier 
highest for capital expenditure. Using data for 17 non-special category states for 2001-14, 
Mishra (2019) found higher multiplier for capital outlay than the revenue expenditure.  
Studies comparing multipliers based on income/economic development have found that 
the size of multiplier was usually lower or negative in developing economies/emerging market 
economies (EMEs), as against positive or higher in developed/high income countries (Ilzetzki 
et al., 2012 and Hory 2015). Poorer institutions reducing economic performance (North, 1990), 
lags in decision and implementation of fiscal policy (Hemming et al., 2002), less flexible 
supply side and larger uncertainty/instability (Hory, 2015) were some of the factors identified 
in these studies for smaller size of multipliers in developing economies/EMEs. In addition, 
Ilzetzki et al. (2012) found the effect of fiscal policy to be transient in developing countries 
and highly persistent in high-income countries. Furthermore, Hory (2015) observed differences 
between advanced economies and EMEs in respect of sensitivity of multipliers to some of its 
determinants. For example, negative sensitivity of public debt was more pronounced in EMEs; 
financial development was found to increase efficiency of public spending in EMEs by higher 
magnitude vis-à-vis advanced economies; negative sensitivity of multiplier for saving rate was 
stronger in EMEs; and the impact of trade openness was negative in EMEs as against positive 
in advanced economies. Koh (2016) found higher fiscal multipliers for advanced economies 
than that of developing countries. In contrast, Contreras and Battelle (2014) found size of 
multiplier higher for developing countries than that for high income countries. They argued 
that the lower multiplier of high income countries was attributed to relatively bigger crowding 
out effect. 
The level of public debt was found to be one of the most important factor determining 
the size of expenditure multipliers. Studies have found evidence of higher public debt 
associated with lower multiplier in both advanced countries and EMEs. Kandil and Morsy 
(2010) employed annual data on 34 emerging countries from 1950 to 2008 and estimated the 
long-run and short-run effects of fiscal impulse on output growth using a panel vector error 
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correction model (VECM). They found higher debt associated with negative effect of fiscal 
impulse on output growth in the long-run. They argued that higher debt and high cost of 
borrowing crowds out private activity and erodes confidence in policy credibility. Ilzetzki et 
al. (2012) found negative multiplier during episodes of high debt (defined as central 
government debt exceeding 60 per cent of GDP). Nickel and Tudyka (2013) examined the 
impact of fiscal stimulus on GDP using interacted panel vector auto-regression (IPVAR) model 
based on annual data from 1970-2010 for 17 European countries. They found effects of 
expansionary fiscal shock on real GDP to be positive, however, at higher levels of debt, the 
effects on real GDP were negative. Contreras and Battelle (2014) found long-run multiplier 
lower at 0.39 for high debt countries vis-a-vis 1.49 for low debt countries due to increase in 
interest rates.  Hory (2015) found that the high levels of public debt lowered multipliers in both 
EMEs and advanced economies, however, the reduction was higher in case of EMEs. Koh 
(2016) found fiscal multipliers lower during episodes of higher debt burden in a sample of 120 
countries. Long-run multiplier was at 0.4 when debt-GDP ratio was higher than 60 per cent, 
and it was ‘zero’ when debt-GDP ratio exceeded 100 per cent. Combes et al. (2016) examined 
fiscal multipliers in Central and Eastern European Countries using a panel VECM and found 
lower impact and cumulative multipliers for high debt countries (average debt-GDP ratio 48 
per cent) vis-à-vis low  debt countries (average debt-GDP ratio 22 per cent).  Deskar-Skrbic et 
al. (2017) analyzed fiscal multipliers for 11 countries in the Central Eastern and Southeastern 
European region using a panel VAR model. They found impact and cumulative multiplier 
lower for high debt countries which was attributed to adverse effects of risk premium and 
private sector confidence on consumption and investment. Huidrom et al. (2019) argued that 
the impact of fiscal stimulus by government with weaker fiscal position (high debt) will be 
lesser. The weaker impact was attributed to (i) Ricardian channel – household expecting tax 
increases sooner than that of the government having stronger fiscal position and thus private 
sector reduces consumption, and (ii) interest rate channel, where increased sovereign debt and 
the consequent rise in bond yield/borrowing cost leads to crowding out of private investment.  
III. Data, Methodology and Empirical Results 
In state budgets, expenditure is classified into revenue (current expenditure) and capital 
(investment). Additionally, for analytical purpose, it can also be classified into development 
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and non-development components7. In this paper, total expenditure and development 
expenditure were chosen for analyzing multipliers. In order to examine impact of expenditure 
on GDP/GSDP, total expenditure is crucial as it directly adds to the aggregate demand. 
However, in this paper, the development expenditure was also chosen due to its following 
attributes. First, it does not include committed expenditure (interest payments, pension and 
administrative services) and thus its nature is relatively discretionary. It includes expenditure 
on social services such as education, health and social welfare; and economic services such as 
agriculture, irrigation, rural development and energy. Second, during the period of this study 
(1990-2016), development expenditure (on an average) accounted for 66 per cent of total 
expenditure. Finally, the development expenditure multipliers were found to be higher than the 
total and revenue expenditure by the studies in Indian context. Among other fiscal variables, 
states’ own tax revenue (OTR) was considered as a control variable due to dependence of 
government expenditures on revenues.  
 The paper employed annual data from 1990-91 to 2015-16 for 25 states8. Data on fiscal 
variables were sourced from the Reserve Bank of India’s State Finances: A Study of Budget 
(various issues) and data on Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) were taken from the 
National Statistical Office (NSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 
Government of India. The GSDP data of different base years9 were adjusted to the latest 2011-
12 base. The fiscal variables have been transformed into natural logarithm after converting into 
real terms by using the GSDP deflator. 
In view of the evidence on role of economy/country specific factors in determining 
expenditure multipliers, state specific characteristics such as debt an income levels were 
considered. Accordingly, states were divided into ‘high debt’, and ‘low debt’ group based on 
debt-GSDP ratio and ‘high income’, and ‘low income’ group based on per capita income. To 
classify states into high debt and low debt group, the average debt-GSDP ratio during 2003-04 
to 2008-09 was considered. The debt-GDP ratio of all states recorded highest level of 31.8 per 
cent in 2003-04 and remained above 31.0 per cent during 2003-04 to 2005-06, however, it 
                                                          
7 Apart from non-development and non-development, grants-in-aid contributions to local bodies needs to be added 
to arrive at total expenditure of states.    
8 In view of bifurcation of states viz., Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Telangana and Uttarakhand data of these states 
have been included in their parent states viz., Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, 
respectively. 
9 From 1990-91 to 2015-16 GSDP data are available in five base years viz., 1980-81, 1993-94, 1999-2000, 2004-
05 and 2011-12.   
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declined sharply in the subsequent years due to adoption of fiscal and institutional reforms10. 
Thus, the period considered for deciding benchmark (2003-04 to 2008-09) captures both fiscal 
stress (high debt and deficit levels) and fiscal consolidation (revenue surplus and decline in 
debt) episodes. The state-wise average debt-GSDP ratio during 2003-04 to 2008-09 was 40 per 
cent. Consequently, states that had average debt-GSDP ratio >40 per cent during 2003-04 to 
2008-09 were classified as high debt states while those with debt-GSDP ratio < 40 per cent 
were considered as low debt states. According to this classification, there were 14 high debt 
states and 11 low debt states (Table 1).  
To classify states into high income and low income group, real per capita net state 
domestic product (NSDP) of 2011-12 base was considered.  The average real per capita NSDP 
from 2011-12 to 2016-17 of all states (excluding Goa and Sikkim) was Rs.74,780 and hence 
benchmark value of per capita income was set at Rs.75,000. Thus, states that had an average 
per capita NSDP of Rs.75,000 or above were classified as high income states (13 states) 
whereas states whose average per capita NSDP was lower than the benchmark of Rs.75,000 
were considered as low income states (12 states).  
Table 1: Classification of States based on Debt and Income Levels 
Public Debt Per Capita Income 
Low High Low High 
Andhra Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Assam Andhra Pradesh 
Assam Bihar Bihar Arunachal Pradesh 
Goa Himachal Pradesh Jammu and Kashmir Goa 
Gujarat Jammu and Kashmir Madhya Pradesh Gujarat 
Haryana Manipur Manipur Haryana 
Karnataka Mizoram Meghalaya Himachal Pradesh 
Kerala Nagaland Nagaland Karnataka 
Madhya Pradesh Odisha Odisha Kerala 
Maharashtra Punjab Rajasthan Maharashtra 
Meghalaya Rajasthan Tripura Mizoram 
Tamil Nadu Sikkim  Uttar Pradesh Punjab 
 Tripura West Bengal Sikkim 
 Uttar Pradesh  Tamil Nadu 
 West Bengal   
(11) (14) (12) (13) 
Note: Figures in parentheses indicates number of states. 
With regard to methodology of empirical estimation, studies have used different 
methods, however, SVAR is used widely following the work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
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 For example, debt swap scheme implemented during 2002-03 to 2004-05 lowered interest burden, value 
added tax helped in higher own tax revenues, and states restricted deficits and debt putting ceilings under their 
Fiscal Responsibility Legislations (FRLs). 
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Further, in panel framework, GMM has been used in some studies (Guimarães, 2010 and 
Contreras and Battelle, 2014). These methods requires taking first differences of the data to 
make them stationary as most of data on fiscal and output variables are non-stationary. In the 
process, there is a possibility of losing information on the relationship among variables at 
levels. Therefore, following Combes et al., 2016, we have used the panel cointegration and 
VECM framework. This framework enables an exploration of the time series properties of the 
data and also helps to capture the common long-term dynamics which are relevant in the 
context of Indian states given the similarities across states in terms of powers to raise revenues, 
expenditure responsibilities and the limits on borrowings.  
The stationarity of variables was checked using the panel unit root tests of Levin-Lin-
Chu (LLC) (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (2003) which are based on the following 
Dickey-Fuller-type regression: ∆yit =α𝑖xit +𝜌iy𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ β𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑖𝑗=1 ∆yi,t-j + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (1) 
Where i=1,…..N number of states, t =1, 2……T number of time period (years) and xit 
represents exogenous variables in the model including fixed effects. 𝜌i are autoregressive 
coefficients and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are errors.  The LLC test assumes common unit root process, whereas the 
IPS test assumes individual unit root process.  
The results portrayed in Table 2 indicate that null hypothesis of panels contain a unit 
root could not be rejected in both the LLC and IPS tests for the baseline panel as well as four 
independent panels viz., high debt states, low debt states, high income states and low income 
states when the variables were considered in levels. This indicates non-stationary properties of 
GDSP, total expenditure, development expenditure and own tax revenue. However, when first 
differences were taken, all variables were found to be stationary for all five panels in both the 
LLC and IPS tests. Therefore, cointegration was checked estimating the Westerlund (2005) 
and Pedroni (1999 and 2004) panel cointegration test for the following two variants (i) GSDP, 
total expenditure and own tax revenue and (ii) GSDP, development expenditure and own tax 
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High Debt States 
LLC Level T-statistics 2.91 3.76 5.28 3.64 
  P-value (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
 First T-statistics -14.28 -18.11 -16.99 -17.46 
 Difference P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IPS Level W-statistics 8.53 7.75 8.98 8.69 
  P-value (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
 First W-statistics -15.11 -17.67 -16.99 -15.62 
 Difference P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Low Debt States 
LLC Level T-statistics 3.38 3.91 4.14 2.25 
  P-value (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
 First T-statistics -9.00 -14.83 -15.91 -11.77 
 Difference P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IPS Level W-statistics 7.56 7.94 8.18 6.43 
  P-value (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
 First W-statistics -9.51 -14.68 -14.70 -11.91 
 Difference P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
High Income States 
LLC Level T-statistics 3.61 3.39 4.11 2.46 
  P-value (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99) 
 First T-statistics -11.94 -16.07 -16.43 -14.15 
 Difference P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IPS Level W-statistics 8.40 7.17 8.38 6.73 
  P-value (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
 First W-statistics -12.04 -16.45 -16.60 -13.76 
 Difference P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Low Income States 
LLC Level T-statistics 2.50 4.44 5.38 3.43 
  P-value (0.99) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
 First T-statistics -11.87 -16.83 -16.26 -15.41 
 Difference P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IPS Level W-statistics 7.70 8.55 8.81 8.55 
  P-value (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
 First W-statistics -12.89 -16.02 -15.14 -13.95 
 Difference P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Note: 1. Automatic lag length selection based on SIC. 
 2. Figures in parentheses are p-values. 
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The standard regression to be estimated for panel cointegration is as follows: 
Yit = 𝛼𝑖+𝛿it +β1iX1i,t + β2iX2i,t+……+ βMiXMi,t+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (2) 
Where i=1, 2…..N number of states, t =1, 2……T number of time period (years),  𝛼𝑖 
and 𝛿𝑖 are individual and trend effects and M is the number of regressors.  Y and X are assumed 
to be integrated of order one I (1). Under the null hypothesis of no cointegration 𝜀𝑖,𝑡will be I 
(1). Thus, if the variables are cointegrated the residual should be I (0). The null hypothesis in 
both the Westerlund and the Pedroni tests is ‘no cointegration’. However, these test differ in 
terms of their alternative hypotheses. The alternative hypothesis in the Westerlund test is ‘some 
panels are cointegrated’ whereas in the Pedroni test it is ‘all panels are cointegrated’. 
The results of the Westerlund and Pedroni panel cointegration tests are provided in 
Table 3. The variance ratio statistics of the Westerlund test pointed to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration and supported the alternative that some panels are cointegrated 
for both the expenditure categories, i.e., total expenditure and development expenditure, in all 
the five panels. Similarly, the results of Pedroni test as indicated by the Phillips-Perron statistic 
and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic suggest rejection of null hypothesis of no 
cointegration in all the five panels.  
Table 3: Results of Panel Cointegration Tests 
 Baseline 
all 25 states  
Public Debt Income 
  High Low  High Low  
Westerlund Test 
Log (GSDP), log(total expenditure), log(own tax revenue) 
Variance ratio statistic  -3.21 -2.26 -2.29 -2.66 -1.86 
P-value 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Log (GSDP), log(development expenditure), log(own tax revenue) 
Variance ratio statistic -3.03 -2.01 -2.30 -2.62 -1.64 
P-value 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 
Pedroni Test 
Log (GSDP), log(total expenditure), log(own tax revenue) 
PP t statistics -3.29 -3.08 -1.78 -2.91 -1.73 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 
ADF t statistics -3.50 -2.04 -2.99 -3.34 -1.59 
P-value 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Log (GSDP), log(development expenditure), log(own tax revenue) 
PP t statistics -4.09 -3.27 -2.44 -3.54 -2.15 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 
ADF t statistics -3.85 -2.08 -3.41 -3.76 -1.60 
P-value 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 
PP: Phillips-Perron          ADF: Augmented Dickey-Fuller.   
Note: The null hypothesis is “no cointegration”. 
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In the next step, error correction model (Pesaran et al., 1999) as indicated by equation 
3 was estimated for cointegrated variables following Combes et al. (2016). 
∆𝑔𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ∅𝑖(𝑔𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖′𝑥𝑖𝑡) + ∑ ∝𝑖𝑗∗ ∆𝑔𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡−𝑗𝑝−1𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗∗ ′∆𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑗 +𝑞−1𝑗=0 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 …..(3) 
Where gsdp is the natural logarithm of real gross state domestic product, ∅ is the error 
correction term, and ‘i’ and ‘t’ stands for state and year, respectively. xit is the vector of 
explanatory variables and µ i indicates state fixed effects. Thus, in equation (3), the first part in 
levels reflects the long-run relationship while the short-run adjustments are captured in the 
second part. Equation (3) can be estimated through Mean Group (MG), Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) and Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) estimator. The MG estimator is considered 
consistent when the slope, intercepts and error variance vary across states. The PMG estimator 
is preferred when long-run slope coefficient is homogeneous but short-run coefficients vary 
across states. Further, a dynamic fixed effect estimator can also be applied, which like the PMG 
assumes homogenous slope but allows intercept to vary across states. The suitability of the 
three estimators can also be checked using the Hausman test. 
Total Expenditure Multipliers  
The results of Hausman test presented in Table 4 and 5 revealed DFE estimator as 
preferred model over MG and PMG indicating significance of unobserved fixed effects across 
states. The results of panel VECM in Table 4 shows statistically significant long-run 
coefficients of total expenditure and own tax revenues in the baseline panel (25 states). The 
negative and statistically significant error correction term indicates validity of the adopted 
model. The short- run coefficient of total expenditure (0.054) which represent the elasticity of 
GSDP with respect to total expenditure was statistically significant. The value of multiplier 
was 0.34 which was obtained dividing short-run coefficient of total expenditure (0.054) by 
average expenditure-GSDP ratio (0.159) for 25 states during 1990-2016.  
In case of panels of low debt and high debt states, the long-run coefficient of own tax 
revenue was statistically significant. Further, convergence to long-run equilibrium relationship 
was confirmed by a negative and statistically significant error correction term for both the 
panels, however, speed of adjustment was higher for low debt states than that of high debt 
states. The short-run coefficient of total expenditure was, however, significant only in low debt 
states panel. Further, as expected, the coefficient was higher at 0.087 than that of high debt 
states and the baseline panel. Accordingly, the value of multiplier for low debt states was higher 
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at 0.62 as compared with 0.34 for baseline panel. These results were consistent with empirical 
studies in the cross-country context finding multipliers positive/higher when debt was low as 
compared to negative/lower when debt was high (Huidrom et al., 2019; Deskar et al., 2017; 
Ilzetzkiet al., 2012 and Combes et al., 2016). These studies argued that the rise in interest 
expenditure can lead to a widening of deficits and crowding out of private savings due to 
excessive borrowings. Another argument given for justifying lower multiplier in debt high 
situation was, the Ricardian Equivalence. In addition, Huidrom et al., 2019, linked lower 
impact of fiscal stimulus in high debt countries to higher interest rate based on their evidence 
of rise in bond yields/borrowing cost due to increased sovereign debt. However, evidence for 
state governments in India suggests that fiscal position do not influence cost of borrowings due 
to the perception of implicit central government guarantee (Saggar et al., 2017 and Bose et al., 
2011). Instead, the higher multiplier for low debt states could be attributed to their favorable 
expenditure composition – higher capital outlay and development expenditure having larger 
multipliers (Raut and Raju, 2019). Low debt states will have lower interest burden which 
facilitates higher discretionary spending such as capital outlay and other development 
expenditure. This was evident from lower share of non-development expenditure (which 
includes interest payments) and increased share of development expenditure and capital outlay 
of states during the low debt phase – 2003-04 to 2008-09 (Chart 1). 




(all 25 states) 
Debt Level Income level 
High  Low  High  Low  
Log(Real GSDP)           
Error correction term 
-0.07***  -0.06*** -0.12*** -0.04* -0.16*** 
(-4.08) (-2.96) (-3.67) (-1.89) (-5.36) 
Log(real total 
expenditure) 
0.422** 0.333 0.237 0.690* 0.351** 
(2.08) (1.16) (0.78) (1.62) (2.11) 
Log (real own tax 
revenue) 
0.518*** 0.546*** 0.708*** 0.564* 0.431*** 
(3.42) (2.83) (2.69) (1.80) (3.40) 
D(log(Real GSDP))           
D(log(real total 
expenditure)) 
0.054** 0.041 0.087** 0.043 0.077** 
(2.25) (1.41) (1.95) (1.43) (1.96) 
D(log (real own tax 
revenue)) 
0.010 -0.010 0.081 0.032 -0.015 
(0.44) (-0.36) (1.46) (0.92) (-0.48) 
Constant 
0.550*** 0.527** 0.938*** 0.283* 1.34*** 
(4.31) (3.15) (3.72) (1.88) (5.55) 
Hausman test 0.95 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 
Pro>chi      
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Note: 1. Figures in parentheses are Z statistics. 




Chart 1: Debt Level and the Composition of Expenditure
 
In the panels of high income and low income states, long-run coefficients of both total 
expenditure and own tax revenue were statistically significant. Further, the error correction 
term also had negative sign and it was statistically significant for both the panel but indicated 
faster speed of adjustment in low income states. With regard to short- run coefficient of total 
expenditure, it was statistically significant and higher for low income states. Therefore, the 
value of multiplier for low income states at 0.41 was higher than that for the baseline panel. 
Development Expenditure Multipliers 
Similar to total expenditure, Hausman test revealed DFE estimator as preferred model 
for all five panels of development expenditure (Table 5). The error correction term was 
negative and statistically significant in all five panels indicating the underlying correction 
mechanism and validity of the model. However, similar to total expenditure estimation, the 
speed of adjustment was highest in panel of low income states (-0.15) followed by low debt 
states (-0.12). The long-run coefficients of development expenditure were statistically 
significant in baseline, high debt and high income panels while the coefficient of own tax 
revenue were significant in all the panels except for high income states. The short-run 
coefficient of real development expenditure at 0.062 for baseline panel was higher than that of 
total expenditure. Accordingly, the size of multiplier was 0.59 suggesting that one unit change 
in development expenditure resulted in 0.59 unit change in real GSDP. This value of 
development expenditure multiplier accounted for 1.74 times of total expenditure multiplier. 
The higher development expenditure multiplier was on expected lines given its discretionary 
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development expenditure multiplier was broadly similar to the findings of earlier studies viz., 
Guimarães (2010) and Jain and Kumar (2013).  
Between high debt and low debt states, the development expenditure multiplier was 
higher for low debt states, as was the case for total expenditure. However, development 
expenditure multiplier was higher (0.67) than that of total expenditure (0.62) reflecting the 
impact of debt on multiplier being channelized through expenditure composition apart from 
Ricardian Equivalence argued by Huidrom et al., 2019; Deskar et al., 2017; Ilzetzkiet al., 2012 
and Combes et al., 2016.  
Between low income and high income states, the development expenditure multiplier 
was found to be higher for high income states. These results were similar to the findings of 
lower/negative multiplier for developing countries and higher/positive for industrial countries 
observed by Ilzetzki et al., 2012; Hory, 2015; and Koh, 2016. These studies argued that 
implementation lags and weaker management of expenditure leads to lower multiplier in 
developing countries/emerging market economies. In addition to these factors, higher 
multipliers of Indian states may be indicating dependency of development expenditure on 
income level (Chakraborty and Dash 2017). 
Table 5: Results of Error Correction Model - Development  Expenditure 
Variables 
 Baseline Panel 
(all 25 states) 
Debt Level Income level 
High  Low  High  Low  
Log(Real GSDP)           
Error correction term 
-0.08***  -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.07*** -0.15*** 




0.511*** 0.467* 0.209 0.970*** 0.219 
(2.87) (1.88) (0.74) (3.64) (1.50) 
Log (real own tax 
revenue) 
0.433 *** 0.433*** 0.728*** 0.248 0.530*** 
(3.41) (2.75) (3.03) (1.42) (4.83) 




0.062*** 0.061** 0.064* 0.068** 0.059** 
(2.71) (2.10) (1.67) (1.95) (1.94) 
D(log (real own tax 
revenue)) 
0.009 -0.011 0.080 0.027 -0.009 
(0.39) (-0.43) (1.41) (0.78) (-0.27) 
constant 
0.619*** 0.598*** 0.956*** 0.457*** 1.29*** 
(4.72) (3.52) (3.76) (2.73) (5.39) 
Hausman test 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 
Pro>chi      
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Note: 1. Figures in parentheses are Z statistics. 




Summary of multipliers provided in Table 6 shows that irrespective of debt or income 
level, development expenditure multiplier was higher than the total expenditure suggesting 
sensitivity of output effects of states expenditure to its composition. In the baseline model, the 
value of development expenditure multiplier was 1.74 times of total expenditure. A comparison 
based on debt shows that low debt states had higher multiplier for both total and development 
expenditure. However, the relatively higher multiplier for development expenditure suggests 
impact of debt on multiplier was channelized through expenditure composition.  
In case of income, total expenditure multiplier was higher for low income states and 
development expenditure multiplier was higher for high income states. This perhaps reflects 
the differences in marginal productivity of total expenditure and development expenditure. The 
higher multiplier of total expenditure for low income states may be pointing to the larger 
implications of non-development expenditure on fiscal services such as collection of taxes and 
administrative services viz., police, district administration and public work, to low income 
states which comprises mainly North-eastern and BIMARU11 states. Therefore, larger total 
expenditure multiplier for low income states could be corroborating positive relationship 
between good governance and economic growth across Indian states (Mundle et al., 2012). On 
the other hand, larger development expenditure multiplier for high income states may be 
indicative of lesser implementation lags and better management of expenditure resulting into 
better infrastructure facilities and higher marginal productivity of discretionary expenditure.  
Table 6: Size of Multipliers: A Comparison 
 Baseline Panel (all 
25 states) 
  
Debt Level Income level 
  High Low High Low 
Total 
Expenditure  
0.34*** 0.21 0.62** 0.31 0.41* 
Development 
Expenditure 
0.59*** 0.51** 0.67**  0.73*  0.48 * 
       ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, as shown in Table 4 and 5. 
V. Conclusion 
 The paper has analyzed multiplier effects for two categories of states expenditure viz., 
total expenditure and development expenditure. The role of state specific factors such as debt 
and income level was assessed by separately estimating multipliers for high debt states, low 
debt states, high income states and low income states. The analysis revealed that the level of 
                                                          
11 The acronym used to collectively indicate states viz., Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh 
which were having similarity in terms of poor economic conditions. 
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debt and income had an impact on multiplier of total expenditure and development expenditure. 
The multipliers for low debt states were found to be higher than that of high debt states 
suggesting prevalence of Ricardian equivalence and crowding out of discretionary expenditure 
– lower capital outlay and development expenditure due to elevated interest payment. Higher 
development expenditure multiplier for high income states may be reflecting lesser 
implementation lags and better management of expenditure in these states. Further, the 
development expenditure multipliers were found to be higher than total expenditure 
irrespective of the income level and debt burden. The findings, thus, highlight the importance 
of development expenditure as a preferred tool for fiscal stimulus at the state level and also 
suggests that development expenditure should not be reduced when undertaking an expenditure 
led fiscal consolidation. 
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